The aim of this paper is to confront the Martin Heidegger position, expressed especially in Sein und Zeit (1927) and Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (1929-1930), on the privileged place that the human being takes in the formulation of the ontological question. In order to do that the text is divided into four sections. The first section makes a succinct introduction to the problem, that is, the question of determining an entity that ensures the access to the question about the sense of being. The second and third focuses on a detailed and critical analysis of the thematization of the human being, as an outstanding entity, in the two works cited. Finally, the last section provides different arguments, from the reference to various works that go beyond a proposal focused on the human being to some theoretical objections, that challenge the Heidegger position and after it proposes the new concept of “ontocentrismo” (analogous to speciesism). With this notion, that means the disadvantageous consideration of entities that do not belong to a certain type of entity, the criticism of the German author is concluded by giving some final indications of non-ontocentric and post-human ontologies, no longer centered on an only being (the human).
|Título traducido de la contribución||The configuration of “ontocentrismo” in Martin Heidegger. Towards the elaboration of non-ontocentric and posthuman ontologies beyond Sein und Zeit” and Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik|
|Número de páginas||20|
|Estado||Publicada - 1 jul. 2021|